How we combine on-chain identity infrastructure with agent-wrapping deployment
botToTrustAnchor mapping — one bot maps to one human, no hierarchykeycard run wrapping — any existing agent gets identity layerSoftware-only identity can be cloned or spoofed. No proof the agent runs on a specific device.
Once registered, an agent is trusted indefinitely. No mechanism to verify ongoing activity or consent.
Revoking a trust anchor leaves orphaned bots still holding valid attestations.
deregisterTrustAnchor() cascadeFlat mapping cannot represent agents spawning sub-agents or delegating authority.
Trust channel rules exist but are only enforced at the resolver level, not at the agent execution boundary.
Zero code changes required. Any existing agent framework gets on-chain identity and reputation passively.
npm i -g @shyft/trust-wraptrust-wrap init --anchor 0x...trust-wrap run -- python agent.pytrust-wrap statusReplace flat botToTrustAnchor mapping with EAS-based attestation system. Per-agent credentials with embedded trust channel rules and expiry.
Implement deregisterTrustAnchor() with automatic child attestation revocation. Surface trust channel rules to agent runtime via attestation metadata.
Ship the CLI tool. Intercept RPC calls, auto-attest agents, begin passive activity tracking. Support LangChain, AutoGPT, and raw Python/JS agents.
Public REST API and on-chain view functions for querying agent reputation scores. Score-gated access patterns for DeFi protocols.
Integrate Apple App Attest and ZKML device proofs for trust anchor verification. Hardware-bound attestations resist cloning and spoofing.
Hierarchical attestation trees: agents can spawn sub-agents with delegated authority and depth limits. Full revocation cascade through the tree.
| Capability | Us (Current) | Keycard | Proposed Hybrid |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identity Binding | Shyft KYC → Trust Anchor → Bot (flat mapping) | Keycard ID → ephemeral session tokens | Shyft KYC → Trust Anchor → EAS Attestation per agent |
| Policy Enforcement | Resolver-level only (ShyftGatedResolver) | Network-edge policy contracts | Resolver + embedded rules in attestation + runtime enforcement |
| Agent Lifecycle | Register once, no expiry or renewal | Ephemeral tokens, auto-expire | Attestation expiry + score-gated renewal cycles |
| Revocation | Manual per-bot, no cascade | Tree-based cascade revocation | deregisterTrustAnchor() with full child cascade |
| Hardware Binding | None | Secure enclave integration | Phase 3: App Attest + ZKML (month 5-6) |
| Reputation | PageRank oracle, citation-based scoring | No reputation layer | PageRank + citations + score feeds attestation renewal |
| Sybil Resistance | KYC-gated (humans only) | Hardware-gated (devices only) | KYC + hardware + reputation (3-layer defense) |
| Decentralization | Fully on-chain, oracle for scores | Policy contracts on-chain, execution off-chain | All on-chain: identity, attestation, policy, reputation |
| GTM Approach | SDK integration required | CLI wrapping, zero code changes | trust-wrap CLI: zero code changes + passive reputation |